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Summary
The conventional wisdom of the application of water
allocation rules in irrigation systems is rarely ques-
tioned. The major reason for this complacence is a
lack of interest in considering water distribution as a
dynamic socio-technical process. A study on a sample
of 22 tertiary level irrigation subsystems (water-
courses) located in 6 secondary canals in 3 different
major canal systems of Pakistan’s Punjab Province
clearly showed that the actual practice of warabandi
water allocation schedules differed substantially from
the design.
Warabandi is a rotational method for equitable
allocation of the available water in an irrigation sys-
tem, by turns fixed according to a time roster, speci-
fying the day, time, and duration of supply to each
irrigator. The warabandi provides a continuous rota-
tion of water in which one complete cycle of rotation
generally lasts 7 days. The duration of supply for
each farmer is proportional to the size of the farmer’s
landholding to be irrigated within the particular wa-
tercourse command area. A certain time allowance is
also given to farmers who need to be compensated
for conveyance time, but no compensation is specifi-
cally made for seepage losses along the watercourse.
Warabandi as an irrigation water allocation
method has been practiced in Pakistan and Northern
India for more than 125 years, and covers an area of
about 24 million hectares of irrigated land in the two
countries. While many environmental factors would
have contributed to the difference in how warabandi
is currently practiced in the two countries, the basic
concepts of warabandi can be traced to a common
origin. This report, however, does not attempt to
compare the historical developments of warabandi in
the two settings, but focuses on the existing gap
between the original design of warabandi as a water
allocation method and the way it is practiced in
Pakistan today.
Not a single watercourse in the study sample had
its official warabandi schedule adhered to in daily
water distribution operations. Instead, all water-
courses with officially sanctioned warabandi had their
schedules subsequently modified according to mutual
agreement among the water users. All modified
warabandi schedules displayed a fair degree of flex-
ibility in terms of time allocation per unit of land, and
resulted in yet greater flexibility in their actual appli-
cation in the field. Thus, a distinction could be made
between “official,” “agreed,” and “actual” warabandi
schedules.
In practice, there were deviations in the list of
water users, the timing of water turns, and the dura-
tion of water turns. The exchange of water turns was
a common feature in all the watercourses studied,
while the trading of water turns was observed only in
5 percent of them. Despite the apparent mutual agree-
ment by the water users, the practiced warabandi
schedules did not relate to a high degree of equity in
water distribution. In the absence of any organized
water user groups, the initiative for these unofficial
modifications appears to have been taken by a few
influential individuals.
Although considerable inequity has crept in
through this process of locally effected modification,
no strong feeling can be discerned among the water
users against the flexibility that has been achieved.
Interviews with farmers served to clarify that this
phenomenon is not different from what exists in other
sectors of the rural economy.
The flexibility in the application of warabandi is
a direct response by the water users to an increasing
variability in the water flow in the canals. The varia-
tions of the water flow into the watercourses have a
combination of spatial and temporal dimensions. The
field data collected in the study indicate diverse wa-
ter flow rates on a daily basis. Interviews with farm-
ers confirmed that the flow variability is a common
occurrence throughout the cropping season. With
such flow fluctuations, the individual water turns for
different farm plots within the watercourse commandarea during a 7–day warabandi rotation period have
widely varying quantities of water per unit of land.
Warabandi, as a water allocation method, is as-
sumed in its design to foster an “integrated water
management system,” with high water use efficiency
and equity in water distribution as objectives. Water
use efficiency is to be achieved through the imposi-
tion of water scarcity on each and every user, and eq-
uity in distribution through an enforced equal share
of scarce water per unit area among all users.
However, the warabandi in practice, while devi-
ating from its design, seems to provide more water to
some of the users and some of the areas. The reasons
for this inequity are many, and are related to both
physical and social factors. The study shows that
some inequity exists in the water allowances them-
selves assigned to different distributaries and water-
courses. Part of this discrepancy is attributable to
post-design changes in the command area and some
ad hoc changes in the hydraulic structures. Although
this design-related discrepancy does not affect the
operations of warabandi within individual water-
course commands, it imposes substantial inequity in
water distribution among different sets of water users
within the whole system and tends to induce corre-
sponding behavioral strategies to circumvent the indi-
vidual disadvantages. In addition, the availability of
groundwater seems to have encouraged the water
users to disregard the discipline of warabandi.
This report highlights the existence of an increas-
ing divergence between design and practice of alloca-
tion rules, and points towards some of its institutional
implications. It also raises the important research
need to evaluate the economic implications of this di-
vergence and the associated flexibility in water use
under conditions of overall water shortage.1
Design and Practice of Water Allocation Rules: Lessons
from Warabandi in Pakistan’s Punjab
D. J. Bandaragoda
Introduction
One of the least known aspects of irrigation
is how the water is actually distributed and
applied by the users. Many officials, re-
searchers, and evaluators associated with ir-
rigation often believe that water is distrib-
uted strictly according to the allocation rules
formulated during the design of the irriga-
tion systems, and they often proceed to con-
duct their respective activities based on that
belief. They use this design assumption
when systems are operated and maintained,
rules are applied and adjudicated, and when
performance indicators are developed and
used. Whenever the systems need to be re-
habilitated and remodeled, only the changes
in the physical conditions are usually consid-
ered, and the original allocation principles
are assumed to be intact, and adequate.
The lack of knowledge on the actual wa-
ter distribution and use can be mainly attrib-
uted to the physical and psychological dis-
tance between the water users and the other
actors of irrigation. The dominance of physi-
cal infrastructure and related physical mea-
surements sharply contrasts with a general
lack of interest in appreciating what happens
beyond the irrigation outlets in the system’s
tertiary units. The diversity of farm struc-
tures and tenurial relations and the dynam-
ics of overall farmer behavior within the ter-
tiary subsystem seem to defy measurement.
Aspects such as social differentiation, politi-
cal influence, and changing socioeconomic
factors escape the attention of many who
generally prefer to focus on what can be eas-
ily observed and measured. Perhaps for this
reason, studies on water allocation practices
at the tertiary level have been relatively rare.
A recent publication draws attention to this
lacuna and highlights the need to evaluate
water distribution as both a physical and so-
cial process (Diemer and Huibers 1996).
In an irrigation system, water allocation
principles are directly related to its estab-
lished water rights. Often in this context,
the term “rights” is used almost synony-
mously with “allocation rules.” The concept
of irrigation development being perceived
as an act of creating hydraulic property
(Coward 1986) implies that the right to use
water is derived from the property rights
linked with the developed irrigation sys-
tem, and the water is allocated accordingly.
Extending this idea to state-built, large-scale
gravity irrigation systems in developing
countries, such as Pakistan, the allocation
rules are seen to be framed by the designers
on behalf of the state (which owns the prop-
erty) to provide the water users with a right
to use water. In such large canal irrigation
systems, particularly when the water avail-
ability is limited, the allocation policies are
based on the need to provide equity in wa-
ter rights to the users, often depending on
the size of their lands to be irrigated.
In the concept of property creation
through irrigation development, the pri-
mary consideration is for the proprietary
rights for water acquired. To give effect to
agreed water rights, the physical distribu-2
tion system is laid out and water allocation
to the legitimate water users is determined
through appropriate rules. The primacy of
the water rights is also reflected in Perry’s
(1995) formulation for functional irrigation
systems, which specifies three interacting
prerequisites for functionality: well-defined
water rights, infrastructure capable of giv-
ing effect to these rights, and assigned op-
erational responsibilities to manage the sys-
tem. Even though a balance among these
three elements is highlighted as essential,
the issue of water rights is portrayed as the
dominant factor. However, in the develop-
ment and management of large-scale irriga-
tion systems in recent times, the direction of
this relative importance has been reversed,
with the aspects of water rights being given
an insignificant consideration.
Warabandi is a rotational method for eq-
uitable allocation of the available water in an
irrigation system by turns fixed according to a
roster, or a predetermined schedule, specifying
the day, time, and duration of supply to each
irrigator in proportion to the size of his or her
landholding in the outlet command (Singh
1981; Malhotra 1982). The term warabandi
means “turns” (wahr) which are “fixed” (bandi).
1
The warabandi water allocation method
practiced in Pakistan’s large-scale canal irri-
gation systems offers some empirical evi-
dence of the relative neglect of water rights
as a major issue in agricultural production.
In the current practice of warabandi, the ac-
tual water distribution is found to deviate
substantially from the design stage expecta-
tions. The implications of this gap between
the design and practice of warabandi are
yet to be fully explored.
Preliminary field observations in two ir-
rigation systems (the newly established
Chashma Right Bank Canal and the recently
remodeled old Lower Swat Canal) in the
North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan
indicated that the ideal warabandi system, as
understood in its traditional concepts, was
no longer observed in actual practice (Levine
1991; Bandaragoda et al. 1993). Both these
systems had some special reason for this
situation. In the former, the water allocation
and distribution methods were still evolving,
whereas in the latter, the established prac-
tices were disrupted due to prolonged con-
struction activities of system rehabilitation.
However, the observations in these two sys-
tems led to the hypothesis that the devia-
tions from the theoretical concepts of
warabandi could be more widespread than
commonly understood, as the technical and
institutional imperatives to make warabandi
fully operational in its original form ap-
peared to have gradually eroded with the
changes in the physical, social, and economic
environment of Pakistan’s irrigation. To test
this hypothesis, field investigations were
conducted in 22 sample watercourses in 3 of
the well-established canal systems (Upper
and Lower Gugera Branches of the Lower
Chenab Canal, and the Fordwah Branch Ca-
nal) of the Punjab Province of Pakistan.
Several studies have already reported
on various aspects of warabandi in Paki-
stan. Some focused on its social dynamics
(Lowdermilk, Clyma, and Early 1975;
Merrey and Wolf 1986; Merrey 1987, 1990),
some on its economic aspects (Chaudhry
and Young 1989; Qureshi, Hussain, and
Zeb-un-Niza 1994), and yet some others on
its performance implications (Bhatti and
Kijne 1990; Latif and Sarwar 1994) and
warabandi-related irrigation management
strategies (Vehmeyer 1992).
This report, which is based on intensive
field work, focuses simply on the existing
gap between the traditional design concepts
of warabandi and its actual practice. Within
this focus, it also outlines some institutional
implications of the present practice of








The warabandi water allocation method has
long been practiced in the northern part of
the subcontinent. Despite some doubts
about the validity of warabandi as an effi-
cient method of water allocation to meet
crop water requirements (Reidinger 1980),
an attempt was made recently to popularize
it in the subcontinent. The efficiency of
warabandi allocation method was sup-
ported by field studies which indicated that,
when the method was correctly applied,
warabandi was capable of producing yields
comparable with the output of a perfect de-
mand system (Narayanamurthy 1985). The
proponents of the warabandi method point
out that its validity has not diminished in
any way as the supply constraints have
continued to characterize irrigated agricul-
ture in this region (Malhotra 1982). Water
scarcity is considered an important physical
condition for the application of warabandi.
Pakistan’s canal irrigation systems oper-
ate largely in a water-short environment. A
major constraint is that the country’s water
resources are unevenly distributed in time
and space. The regulatory reservoirs
(Tarbela, Mangla, and Chashma) are unable
to fully compensate for this unevenness, par-
ticularly at the start of the kharif (summer)
season when river flows are low. About 84
percent of the total annual river flow occurs
during the full kharif season, whereas, 36
percent of canal head withdrawal takes place
during the rabi (winter) season (Government
of Pakistan 1993: 36). In addition to the in-
compatibility between streamflows in the
major rivers and the pattern of water require-
ments of the main cropping seasons, the rela-
tive abundance of water in a few areas co-
exists with severe shortages in other areas.
The need to use the scarce water
resources judiciously and economically has
been the main concern of system designers
from the early days of irrigation
development in Pakistan. The design was
for a run-of-river system with an objective
to command a maximum area with the
available supplies in the river, ensuring
equitable distribution
2 at all levels of the
system—canals, branches, distributaries,
and outlets, and also among the individual
water users.
According to this design, the “water al-
lowance”
3 was fixed relatively low to maxi-
mize the irrigated command area using the
available water. However, the design as-
sumed a low cropping intensity of about 75
percent to make irrigation reasonably pro-
ductive in these systems. Over the years,
more and more commandable land was
placed under irrigation in both seasons, and
these design cropping intensities have now
exceeded considerably. Increased cropping
intensity has made the design supply of ca-
nal water rather inadequate.
4
The canals were to run most of the time
at the authorized full supply level and be
closed when the supplies fell to 70–75
percent of the full supply discharge to
avoid silting. The equitable distribution of
water was to be effected without much
operational control (e.g., the distributary
outlets had no gates, but had fixed
structures to provide constant discharges
proportional to the area to be irrigated in
each of the watercourse commands). Within
a limited range of flow variability within
the distributary, the watercourses were
expected to obtain an almost constant
discharge. With the system being structured
at the distributary head, only passive
management was required for proportional
distribution of water by the distributaries.
The Case of Warabandi in Pakistan
2Equity attempted was
in terms of allocation of
water proportional to
land.
3Water allowance is the
design discharge as-
signed to the head of a
distributary or a water-
course on the basis of
the area to be irrigated
and is given in cusecs
per acre in local use, and
in liters per second per
hectare (l/s/ha) in this
report.
4On a 100 percent crop-
ping intensity, an aver-
age water allowance of
0.28 l/s/ha (4 cusecs for
1,000 acres) works out to
a meager irrigation
depth of 2.4 millime-
ters/day from canal wa-
ter, representing a con-
siderable water-short
situation indeed.4
Social Environment of Warabandi
South Asia’s long history of irrigation de-
velopment and associated irrigation culture
(Bandaragoda 1993) contributed to the origi-
nal design as well as the eventual quality
and shape of irrigation institutions such as
warabandi in the region. The origin of
warabandi is traced to the early period of
irrigation development by the British in the
northwestern part of the subcontinent in the
mid-nineteenth century (Malhotra 1982).
However, the origins of warabandi concepts
could well have occurred much earlier, al-
though no recorded history can be found
referring to this linkage.
The legal framework for water distribu-
tion seems to reflect some local traditions,
which may have been transferred from vari-
ous cultural influences of many different
eras, such as those of the Indus Civilization,
the Aryans, the Greeks, and the Arabs. The
preference for social control of natural re-
sources, the ruler’s responsibility for social
welfare, local participation in resource man-
agement, ready compliance with regi-
mented and formalistic administration, ad-
herence to legalism, and subservience to lo-
cal feudalistic power are only some of the
features of a highly complex cultural milieu.
In this amalgam, the principle of equity in
water distribution that is central to irriga-
tion laws in this region has the stamp of an
influence by the Islamic principles, such as
communal ownership and equitable sharing
of water, and the ethics of social control
over water. The legislative enactments of
the mid-nineteenth century have benefited
from the same principles, which the British
discovered in the Moorish elements of the
irrigation traditions found in Spain.
In sum, warabandi can be seen as part
of the local culture, which has evolved
through centuries of association with irriga-
tion including its formalized administration
since 1873. Also, the colonial irrigation ad-
ministration could have been partly mod-
eled on the earlier irrigation development
experiences of Europe, which the British
studied before introducing irrigation laws in
the subcontinent.
5
However, just as equity was related to
some facets of local culture, the erosion of
equity in its application was also caused by
other facets of the same culture. In this re-
gion where warabandi was first introduced,
the social conditions largely determined
how the system operated, and how the flex-
ibility of warabandi’s initial version was
used. Malhotra (1982:1), referring to the pre-
1873 situation, opines that “the arrangement
could have fitted well with the then politi-
cal system,” when the administration found
it more convenient to use the few big land-
lords for settling local disputes and main-
taining law and order. As the big landlords
“managed to arrange some sort of consen-
sus,” field-level water distribution posed no
difficulty, but the flexibility could have been
used at the expense of the weaker sections
of the community. A more recent assess-
ment of warabandi in Pakistan’s southern
Punjab and Sindh is that any flexibility in
warabandi “suits the irrigation needs of
large farmers” (Qureshi, Hussain, and Zeb-
un-Niza 1994).
With increased political awareness and
social development, and also with the
gradual subdivision of large landholdings,
the role of the big landlords was increas-
ingly challenged, and the disputes started
to undermine their authority. With increas-
ing cropping intensities, the demand for
water increased, thereby causing greater
competition, and obviously more conflicts.
Disputes among farmers led to greater
agency involvement. Agency staff inter-
vened to assess the ownership of land, its
size and proximity to water, and also filling
and drainage times, before fixing the time
5During 1867-68, the
Government of India
sent Lt. Col. C. C. Scott-
Moncrieff on a study
tour of France, Spain,
and Italy to study the ir-
rigation systems then in
use. His 1868 report, run-
ning to 380 pages and 27
plates with an amazing
account of his travels in
Europe, described in




irrigation fees. He found
that nearly all the sys-
tems were supply-based,
with a schedule fixed at
the beginning of the sea-
son. His chart for the
Marseilles Canal is al-
most identical to a
warabandi schedule. The
crucial difference be-
tween the European sys-
tems reported on by
Moncrieff and the
warabandi system as
adopted in the 1873
Northern Indian Canal
Act was that the
warabandi supply was
given through propor-
tional modules and not
rigid modules that pro-
vided fixed flows in





6 Once fixed, it as-
sumed common agreement; the turns were
supposed to be followed unaltered and be-
came binding on all the farmers who had to
take water at their turn irrespective of their
need. Even when water flow was disrupted
due to some physical condition in the ca-
nals, the time schedule was not to be al-
tered; in which case, the loss had to be ab-
sorbed by the unlucky individual farmer or
farmers who happened to be rostered for
that particular time interval. The authority
and influence of the big landlords were re-
placed in some instances, and supple-
mented in others, by the officials.
The rigidity of warabandi was meant to
ensure equity and “to prevent exploitation
of the weak by the strong, or of tail-enders
by head-enders” (Chaudhry and Young
1989). Merrey (1987, 1990) questions the
sustainability of this rigid centrally deter-
mined warabandi system in Pakistan. He
acknowledges, however, the limitations of
available technical alternatives, particularly
in view of the “imbeddedness” of
warabandi in rural Pakistan. More than this
cultural fixation, the pressures inherent in
equitably distributing scarce water re-
sources tend to determine the continued
value of warabandi as an allocation method.
Generally, the concerns on its
sustainability and criticisms against the con-
tinued practice of warabandi (Reidinger
1980) are based on the assumption that of-
ficial warabandi (as originally conceptual-
ized and described in manuals) is actually
being practiced today. On the contrary, the
situation in Pakistan is characterized by the
existence of a dualism between a set of for-
mally established rules and organizations,
and a parallel set of informal institutions,
with the latter appearing to have an over-
riding effect over the former (Bandaragoda
and Firdousi 1992).
Design of Warabandi
Concept of Warabandi as an
Allocation Method
Warabandi is a continuous rotation of water
in which one complete cycle of rotation
lasts 7 days (or in some instances, 10½
days), and each farmer in the watercourse
receives water during one turn in this cycle
for an already fixed time duration. The
cycle begins at the head and proceeds to the
tail of the watercourse, and during each
time turn, the farmer has the right to use all
of the water flowing in the watercourse.
Each year, preferably at canal closure, the
warabandi cycle or roster is rotated by 12
hours to give relief to those farmers who
had their turns during the night in the pre-
ceding year’s schedule. The time duration
for each farmer is proportional to the size of
the farmer’s landholding to be irrigated
within the particular watercourse command
area. A certain time allowance is also given
to farmers who need to be compensated for
conveyance time, but no compensation is
specifically made for seepage losses along
the watercourse.
In the large canal irrigation systems in
Pakistan, which are jointly managed by
government agencies and farmers,
warabandi rules and traditions act as the
binding glue for an agency-farmer interface.
A central irrigation agency manages the pri-
mary main canal system and its secondary
level “distributary” and “minor” canals,








and explains the respon-
sibilities of Patwaris,
Zilladars, and the Canal
Officers.6
and delivers water at the head of the ter-
tiary level “watercourse” through an outlet,
popularly known as a mogha, which is de-
signed to provide a quantity of water pro-
portional to the watercourse’s culturable
command area (CCA). The agency has to
ensure a uniform flow in the watercourse so
that it continuously receives its allotted wa-
ter duty (quantity of water per unit area).
Farmers within the watercourse are ex-
pected to manage the on-farm distribution
of water according to a warabandi schedule,
officially “sanctioned,” or established solely
on the basis of mutual agreement by the
farmers. Once this arrangement of turns has
been agreed upon, the agency does not in-
terfere unless a dispute arises among the
farmers and it is brought to official notice.
The dispute is resolved through an adjudi-
cation process according to prescribed rules
leading to either an amendment of the ex-
isting official warabandi schedule, or the
sanctioning of a new one if an official
schedule had not existed before the dispute.
Popularly, the term “warabandi” has
been associated with the water allocation
and distribution within the tertiary sub-
system (watercourse). However, considering
the conditions for equitable water distribu-
tion, some analysts have pointed out that
“warabandi” is an integrated water man-
agement system extending from the source
to farm gate (Malhotra 1982:38). The need to
equitably distribute the limited water re-
sources available in an irrigation system
among all the legitimate water users in that
system is a basic premise underlying the
principle of warabandi. Clearly, in that
sense, it involves more than the water-
course, although the literal meaning of
warabandi prompts one to focus attention
on the roster part of the warabandi system.
The warabandi system, among other
things, has the following characteristics as
well.
• The distributing points of the main ca-
nal operate at supply levels that would
allow distributary canals to operate at
no less than 75 percent of full supply
level.
• There is rotation of distributaries, in
some instances, when the supply in the
main canal system falls further.
• Only “authorized” outlets draw their
allotted share of water from the dis-
tributary at the same time.
• Outlets are ungated and deliver a flow
of water proportional to the area com-
manded.
• Water users have to maintain the water-
course in good condition.
• The operating agency has to ensure
proper hydraulic performance of the
conveyance system.
Two types of warabandi are frequently
mentioned. The warabandi which has been
decided by the farmers solely on their mu-
tual agreement, without formal involvement
of any government agency, is known as
kachcha (ordinary or unregulated)
warabandi, whereas, the warabandi decided
after field investigation and public inquiry
by the Irrigation Department when disputes
occurred, and issued in officially recognized
warabandi schedules, is called pucca
warabandi.
Kachcha warabandi became increas-
ingly unpopular as it was prone to exploita-
tion by large landowners. Wherever this
pressure could be challenged openly, dis-
putes were registered with the canal au-
thorities, and after prescribed adjudication
processes, the kachcha warabandi was con-
verted to official pucca warabandi sched-
ules. The reason for having kachcha
warabandi still in operation in some areas7
of southern Punjab and Sindh is attributed
to the more skewed distribution of land fa-
voring larger landowners in these areas. In
central Punjab, the majority of watercourses
have pucca warabandi.
Objectives of Warabandi
As an “integrated water management sys-
tem,” warabandi is expected to achieve two
main objectives: high efficiency, and equity
in water use (Malhotra 1982). Water use ef-
ficiency is to be achieved through the impo-
sition of water scarcity on each and every user,
and equity in distribution through enforced
equal share of scarce water per unit area among
all users. Both objectives are to be guaran-
teed by the “self-policing” rotation system.
An All-India Workshop on Warabandi
held at Hyderabad in April 1980, listed a
number of other advantages including in-
creased cropping intensity, greater irrigation
discipline, common interest, and greater
economy and dependability (Singh 1981).
Further, its transparency and the simplicity
of implementation were identified as two of
its main positive features. However, the eq-
uity issue dominated the analyses on what
warabandi could conceivably bring about as
benefits. In sum, the Workshop noted,
warabandi was to introduce “some kind of
system, some kind of fair play” into the use
of water, to make sure that the available
water is really used in “every plot in the
area being irrigated, not simply the plots
that belong to the most powerful individual
in the village” (Singh 1981:iii–iv). Makin
(1987) identified equity of distribution as
warabandi’s primary objective. He found
that warabandi, with some minor modifica-
tions, was still operating successfully in In-
dian Punjab, and despite several externally
imposed factors, the farmers in the Mudki
Distributary study area were finding ways
of maintaining equity, which they see as the
underlying spirit of warabandi.
Relying on the many virtues of
warabandi as theoretically framed, particu-
larly its fairness, the tendency of many
people is to believe that warabandi “en-
sures equity in distribution to each farmer’s
field, regardless of whether the land is situ-
ated at the upper reaches of the outlet or at
the tail end, whether the farmer is economi-
cally or politically powerful or not, and
whether he belongs to a low or high caste”
(Singh 1981: 23). With the usual preference
to rely on conventional wisdom, very little
investigation has been made to explore how
well the theory is applied in the field.
In Pakistan, the equity in water
distribution is commonly perceived as the
central operational objective for the
management of its large canal system
through warabandi (Government of
Pakistan 1988; Kirmani 1990; Bhutta and
Vander Velde 1992; Latif and Sarwar 1994).
Equity is usually assumed to occur if the
system functions as designed, or if each
water user gets the share that was intended
in the design (Levine and Coward 1989). In
this sense, equitable water distribution in
the Indus Basin Irrigation System can be
interpreted as an intention to deliver a fair
share of water to all users throughout the
system using warabandi. There is a
recognition of the need for head to tail
equity in terms of equalizing the delivery of
water between the extremities in the
conveyance system; there is also the need to
see equitable distribution among various
distribution points in the system, as well as
among the various categories of water
users. The term “equity” was interpreted in
a restricted sense in that the idea was to
equitably distribute water per unit of land.
This would mean that larger landowners
would have access to larger quantities of
irrigation water.8
Interestingly, the disputes related to the
application of warabandi are uncommon,
and whenever they occurred, there was no
major disruption of the warabandi practice.
Considering the usual turmoil and social
tension that would be normally associated
with a shortage of irrigation water, that
warabandi has continued as “a method of
imposing such extreme scarcity, over such
large areas, and for such a long time has
been considered little short of a miracle”
(Malhotra, Raheja, and Seckler 1984).
Formulation of Warabandi
Schedules
The warabandi schedule is framed under
Section 68 of the Canal and Drainage Act
(VIII of 1873) in which rights to form and
maintain water distribution schedules for
watercourses are vested with the Canal Of-
ficers of the Irrigation Department. Several
amendments and departmental rules were
added later.
Theoretically, in calculating the dura-
tion of the warabandi turn given to a par-
ticular farm plot, some allowance is added
to compensate for the time taken by the
flow to fill that part of the watercourse lead-
ing to the farm plot. This is called khal
bharai or watercourse “filling time.” Simi-
larly, in some cases, a farm plot may con-
tinue to receive water from a filled portion
of the watercourse even when it is blocked
upstream to divert water to another farm or
another part of the watercourse command.
This is called nikal or “draining time,” and
is deducted from the turn duration of that
farm plot.
The calculation for a warabandi sched-
ule starts with determining by observation,
the total of such filling times (TF) and the
total of such draining times (TD). Then, for
a weekly warabandi rotation, the unit irri-
gation time (TU) in hours per hectare can be
given by:
TU = (168 - TF + TD) / C,
where, C = culturable command area of the
watercourse.
The value of TU should be the same for
all the farmers in the watercourse. A
farmer’s warabandi turn time Tt is given
by:
Tt = TU x A + Tf - Td,
where, A is the farm area, and Tf and Td are
filling time and draining time, respectively,
for the farm area.
Only some of the farms in a water-
course may be entitled to either filling time,
or draining time, or both. The warabandi
schedule is prepared on the basis of the dif-
ferent turn times calculated for each farm
plot on the basis of these values, wherever
they occur, and on the area of each farm
plot.
The main obstacle to achieving equity
as defined above has been varying seepage
losses along the watercourses. Theoretically,
this problem could have been dealt with
readily by creating a virtual imaginary land
area for the tail enders, but such a strategy
has not been tried, probably because it
would have involved some ad hoc decisions
and destroyed the transparency of the origi-
nal concept.9
Warabandi, as a water allocation method
with its underlying primary objective of dis-
tributing the restricted supplies of canal
water equitably over a large command area,
typically suited the “protective irrigation”
in Pakistan. The original system design was
meant to maintain a steady pattern of hy-
draulic performance for the canal system;
the application of an official warabandi had
to heavily rely on this original system de-
sign. However, the deterioration of the re-
quired physical and social conditions made
the original assumptions for equity-based
warabandi increasingly invalid. A 1988 field
study reported that discharge variation at
the head of the distributaries greatly ex-
ceeded the original design criteria (Bhutta
and Vander Velde 1992).
The deviations from the design concept
of equity appear to be arising from three
major sources: (1) some aberrations in the
design and construction of the physical sys-
tem, which make some channels get more
water per unit area than the others; (2) flow
variability in the conveyance system, which
makes the concept of equity through fixed
time-turns invalid; and (3) variations in the
water turn roster. The first two sources are
associated with the conditions for
warabandi, which are directly related to the
quality of design, construction, and mainte-
nance efforts. The third source of deviations
is related to the way the water users apply
warabandi schedules.
The allocation of the Indus Basin water
among the various canals and their
branches (main canal system) and the dis-
tributaries (secondary canal system), and
from there to the large network of water-
courses (tertiary subsystem) was decided by
a set of design rules. The structures were
built accordingly. A scrutiny of the design
data relating to this allocation shows that a
Effects of Design, Construction, and Maintenance
fair degree of inequity has crept in during
design and construction, and possibly dur-
ing subsequent rehabilitation.
Inequities in the Main System
The six distributary (secondary) systems
covered by the study sample belong to two
main canals, the Lower Chenab Canal
(LCC) and the Fordwah Canal. The design
information given in table 1 indicates that
the “water allowances”
7 given to the two
main systems vary substantially.
Table 1 also shows that the four se-
lected distributary canals in the LCC have a
wide range of water allowances that vary
from a very low 0.19 l/s/ha in the Manan-
wala Distributary to a high 0.32 l/s/ha in
the Pir Mahal Distributary. More impor-
tantly, there is a marked difference in
water allowances between the Pir Mahal
Distributary (0.32 l/s/ha) and its own
Junejwala Minor (0.24 l/s/ha). The indica-
tion is that the design itself has caused sig-
nificant differences in water allowances per
unit area between the different distribu-
taries or minors. Alternatively, it is also
likely that command areas under some ca-
nal systems were subsequently increased
while their supply levels remained unal-
tered.
Inequities at the Secondary Canal
Level
Table 2 gives the water allowances assigned
to the 22 sample outlets.
8 Data in tables 1
and 2 show that there are both inter- and
intra-canal differences in water allowances.
Differences between the distributary canals
can be attributed to design errors, but the
7See footnote no. 4 for
the definition.
8Among the various
records kept by the Pro-
vincial Irrigation De-
partment’s divisional of-
fices are the “Outlet
Registers,” which refer
to design discharge, de-
sign CCA, and other de-
tails of each outlet in the
area. Information col-
lected from this source
was analyzed to calcu-
late the water allow-
ances (design discharge
per unit CCA) for each
sample outlet.10
TABLE 1.
Characteristics of sample distributaries and minors.
Distributary/Minor CCA (ha) Status Design discharge Water allowance
(m3/s) (l/s/ha)
Lower Chenab Canal Irrigation System
Mananwala 27,160 P 5.2 0.19
Karkan 9,460 P 2.0 0.21
Pir Mahal 14,890 P 4.7 0.32
Junejwala 4,050 P 1.0 0.24
Fordwah Branch Canal Irrigation System
Azim 12,200 NP 6.9 0.57
Fordwah 14,940 P 4.38 0.30
Notes: P:Perennial; NP: Non-perennial.
TABLE 2.
Characteristics of 22 sample watercourses.
Watercourse CCA (ha) Design discharge Water allowance No. of No. of
(l/s) (l/s/ha) landowners cultivators
LOWER CHENAB CANAL (LCC) IRRIGATION SYSTEM
Upper Gugera Branch of LCC
MW 24873-R 171 24.4 0.14  30  41
MW 43506-R 225 29.7 0.13  74  81
MW 71683-R 289 38.2 0.13 114 116
MW 87670-R 240 47.9 0.20  48  58
MW 121735R 255 33.7 0.13 237 254
MW 141542R 514 68.0 0.13 153 158
KN 10435-R 158 31.4 0.20  71  70
KN 54892-R 231 46.2 0.20 124  92
Lower Gugera Branch of LCC
PM 70076-R 187 37.1 0.20 93 77
PM 89250-L 174 46.2 0.27 103 124
PM 133970-L 223 44.2 0.20 186 180
JW 6619-R 118 31.1 0.26 131 122
JW 27290-R 140 29.2 0.21 56 51
JW 41234-L 159 31.7 0.20 92 81
FORDWAH BRANCH CANAL IRRIGATION SYSTEM
AZ 20610-L 119 45.9 0.39 26 26
AZ 43260-L 66 25.5 0.39 16 16
AZ 63620-L 121 59.2 0.49 20 20
AZ 111770-L 119 45.9 0.39 27 27
FW 14320-R 196 52.1 0.26 82 82
FW 46725-R 172 44.7 0.26 47 47
FW 62085-R 133 33.4 0.25 47 47
FW 130100-R 256 68.0 0.26 58 58
Notes: MW = Mananwala Distributary; KN = Karkan Minor of Mananwala Distributary; PM = Pir Mahal Distributary;
JW = Junejwala Minor of Pir Mahal Distributary; AZ = Azim Distributary; FW = Fordwah Distributary.11
conspicuously high water allowance values
for watercourses within the same distribu-
tary canal point towards physical modifica-
tions to outlets, since the original design.
While these modifications are entered in the
official outlet registers, there are other unau-
thorized modifications, locally referred to as
“mogha tampering.” Considerable variabil-
ity in the water allowances for watercourses
negates the effect of equity attempted by
warabandi schedules for water allocation
within the watercourses.
In a further analysis of design data,
table 3 gives the ranges and averages of de-
sign water allowances of all of the water-
courses in the six distribution systems.
In table 3, a wide variation can be seen
in water allowances assigned for individual
watercourses along each of the six distribu-
tary/minor canals. The results show a sub-
stantial divergence between the common
design intention of providing a uniformly
low water allowance and the application of
this design parameter during construction
of the physical system.
In the case of the Mananwala Distribu-
tary, the maximum water allowance given
to a watercourse is exceptionally high, al-
most three times the average, whereas the
minimum is at 86 percent of the average.
Similarly, in the Pir Mahal Distributary, the
maximum water allowance given to a wa-
tercourse is 311 percent of the average and
the minimum is 75 percent of the average
indicating that a few outlets were given an
exceptionally high water allowance. Infor-
mal pressure brought about by some influ-
ential people during design or construction
of the irrigation system cannot be over-
ruled. Irrespective of the causes, these inter-
canal supply differences and sporadic sup-
ply increases to a few watercourses greatly
affect the overall equity in water distribu-
tion within the whole irrigation system.
Inequities at the Tertiary Level
Theoretically, the total flow in a watercourse
should be available to each water user dur-
ing his or her warabandi water turn. There-
fore, once the design water allowance is es-
tablished for the watercourse, a design-re-
lated inequity does not arise within the wa-
tercourse command area. However, during
the design of the warabandi schedule speci-
fying the time and duration of each water
turn, some inequity can enter the formula-
tion. In an analysis of time allocations in
official warabandi schedules, the coefficient
TABLE 3.
Variations in water allowances given to watercourses in 6 selected distributary and minor canals.
Distributary/Minor Range of water Average water Coefficient
allowance (l/s/ha) allowance of variation
Minimum Maximum (l/s/ha)   (%)
Mananwala (n=74) 0.13 0.52 0.15 35
Karkan (n=47) 0.17 0.30 0.20 8
Pir Mahal (n=47) 0.20 0.84 0.27 58
Junejwala (n=19) 0.14 0.28 0.21 13
Azim (n=75) 0.38 0.67 0.44 14
Fordwah (n=87) 0.24 0.55 0.26  1412
of variation of time allocations was found to
be significantly low. Evidently, the design-
related inequity is least within the tertiary
subsystem (watercourses).
Variability of Flow into the
Secondary Canal
The design concepts of warabandi assume
that each distributary canal, by and large,
maintains a flow close to about 75 percent
of the full supply level. To test this
assumption, the actual discharges into the
six selected distributaries and minors were
measured once a day for the 1993 kharif
season. The results of this exercise are given
in table 4, which includes the standard
deviation for each monthly average, and the
monthly average as a percentage of the
design discharge for the respective
distributary canals.
Monthly average flows in the
Mananwala Distributary varied from 85 to
103 percent of the design discharge level,
while flows in its Karkan Minor ranged
from 70 to 86 percent. The Minor’s monthly
average supply did not reach the design
discharge level during this period, and
lagged behind that of the parent dis-
tributary. A similar situation was seen in the
Pir Mahal Distributary and its Junejwala
Minor. Seasonal flow variability was also
quite high in the Pir Mahal, the flows
varying from 66 to 106 percent of the design
discharge, whereas its Junejwala Minor had
a much greater fluctuation of supplies
ranging from 29 to 66 percent of the design
discharge, remaining constantly below the
required minimum flow level of 75 percent
of the design value.
Similarly, the Azim Distributary re-
ceived low flows from 28 to 65 percent of
the design discharge, while the Fordwah
Distributary had relatively favorable
monthly average supplies, although with a
high variability ranging from 56 to 117 per-
cent during the season.
Generally, the distributaries frequently
remained consistently below the design
supply level. Monthly averages and their
standard deviations show considerable daily
variations in the actual discharge. The
TABLE 4.
Monthly averages of actual discharges for sample distributaries during kharif 1993.
Distributary/ Design Actual discharge: Monthly average, its standard deviation (in parentheses),
Minor discharge and as a percentage of design discharge
(m3/sec) May June July August September October
Mananwala 5.21 4.64, (0.17), 4.59, (0.85), 4.45, (1.59), 5.32, (0.14), 5.38, (0.57), 5.10, (0.25),
89 88 85 102 103 98
Karkan Minor 1.98 1.42, (0.08), 1.56, (0.08), 1.39, (0.59), 1.61, (0.08), 1.70, (0.28), 1.70, (0.08),
71 79 70 81 86 86
Pir Mahal 4.70 4.02, (1.56), 3.96, (1.76), 3.12, (2.24), 4.47, (2.27), 4.98, (2.32), 4.64, (2.89),
85 84 66 95 106 99
Junejwala Minor 0.99 0.37, (0.14), 0.42, (0.14), 0.37, (0.20), 0.28, (0.14), 0.59, (0.17), 0.65, (0.14),
37 43 37 29 60 66
Azim 6.91 3.57, (1.61), 4.50, (1.67), 1.95, (2.15), 3.60, (1.90), 3.77, (2.46), 2.95, (2.44),
52 65 28 52 55 43
Fordwah 3.99 4.19, (0.31), 3.74, (1.05), 2.24, (2.24), 3.88, (1.59), 4.28, (1.50), 4.67, (1.25),
104 94 56 97 107 11713
consequences of distributary water-flow
variability on the warabandi practice are
twofold: First, the flow variability during the
season imposes severe inequity in water
distribution within the watercourses, as the
irrigation time per hectare does not change
according to this variable flow. Second,
when the flow drops substantially, say
below 70 percent of the design discharge,
some watercourses receive very little water
or no water at all, causing inequitable water
distribution among the watercourses. Any
attempt to circumvent this by effecting a
rotation along the distributary would also
cause a disruption of the warabandi
schedules.
Variability of Flow into the
Tertiary Subsystem
To assess the actual water distribution, the
daily discharges were monitored in the 22
sample outlets. Part of the results of this
monitoring effort, related only to the
Mananwala Distributary and its Karkan
Minor, is shown in table 5. Because the
design discharge is closely linked with the
irrigable area of a particular watercourse,
the parameter for assessing the performance
is the percentage of design discharge
actually delivered (also known as the
Delivery Performance Ratio). The data show
that the actual average discharges into
watercourses deviate significantly from
their design discharges. The average actual
discharge as a ratio of design discharge for
a watercourse varies from a very high 214
percent in September for the Mananwala
Distributary’s Watercourse No. 87-R, to a
zero percentage in September and October
for its tail-reach Watercourse No. 141-R.
Figure 1 represents a summary of the
analysis of data collected from 22 sample
watercourses (outlets) for the period May to
July 1993. Of the 22 watercourses, 6 had an
TABLE 5.
Monthly averages of actual discharges for sample outlets in Upper Gugera (LCC) during kharif 1993.
Outlet no. Design Actual discharge: Monthly average, its standard deviation (in parentheses),
discharge and as a percentage of design discharge
(l/sec) May June July August September October
MW 24-R 24.4 32.8, (6.5), 34.3, (15.6), 38.2, (18.4), 47.6, (14.4), 51.5, (9.1), 42.8, (9.1),
135 141 157 195 212 176
MW 43-R 29.7 33.1, (0.6), 33.4, (0.6), 29.2, (11.3), 34.5, (0.6), 34.5, (1.4), 34.3, (0.6),
114 112 98 116 116 115
MW 71-R 38.2 43.3, (0.6), 43.3, (0.8), 37.9, (14.7), 44.5, (0.8), 44.2, (2.3), 44.5, (0.6),
113 113 99 116 116 116
MW 87-R 47.9 88.6, (4.8), 90.6, (4.0), 84.1, (36.5), 99.1, (6.8), 102.2, (9.9), 101.7, (7.1),
185 189 176 207 214 212
MW 121-R 33.7 43.6, (3.1), 43.0, (1.4), 31.4, (3.7), 44.7, (2.3), 43.3, (2.0), 43.6, (0.8),
129 128 93 133 129 129
MW 141-R 68.0 26.1, (7.1), 16.1, (6.8), 15.0, (11.0), 16.7, (7.4), 0 0
38 24 22 25 0 0
KN 10-R 31.4 32.0, (2.8), 33.4, (3.4), 27.2, (12.7), 31.4, (8.5), 37.9, (9.1), 33.4, (2.3),
102 106 87 100 121 106
KN 54-R 46.2 36.0, (3.7), 37.9, (4.2), 27.5, (5.9), 44.5, (4.8), 45.3, (4.5), 47.3, (3.1),
78 82 60 96 98 102
MW = Mananwala Distributary; KN = Karkan Minor of MW.14
actual average discharge at the outlet over
120 percent of the design discharge for this
period, 5 had an average discharge less
than 80 percent of the design, and 11 were
within 80–120 percent of the design value.
Both in terms of time (daily discharges
and monthly averages) and space (between
watercourses within each distributary ca-
nal), there was considerable variation in
water delivery at the mogha head. Thus,
one of the most critical conditions for
warabandi has ceased to exist when the
flow into the watercourse has fluctuated so
widely.
Few allocation methods can be effective
in providing sufficient irrigation if there is
high variability in the flow of water in the
channels. A method such as warabandi,
which relies on a constant flow in the wa-
tercourse for its time allocations propor-
tional to land size, is much less effective
when confronted with the extent of variabil-
ity as shown in the above data. One hy-
pothesis at this stage is that the widespread
modification of official warabandi schedules
by the water users (discussed later in this
report) may have been prompted by the
high variability of the water supply at the
farm gate.
A graphic presentation of the extent of
flow variability at the watercourse head can
be seen in figures 2 and 3, which show the
pattern arising from some field data col-
lected for another year (1991). The two
graphs are for Watercourse No. 24-R of
Mananwala and Watercourse No. 133-L of
Pir Mahal and they confirm the extent of
flow variability found at the watercourse
head during kharif 1993.
FIGURE 1
Actual average discharge for the kharif 1993 season as a percent-
age of the design discharge for 22 sample outlets.
FIGURE 2.
Daily discharges in Watercourse No. 24-R of Manawala.
FIGURE 3.
Daily discharges in Watercourse No. 133-L of Pir Mahal.15
From Design to Practice of Warabandi
In theory, the official warabandi is to be
implemented according to an officially de-
termined fixed schedule, which is meant to
be strictly adhered to by all water users so
that its underlying objective of equitable
distribution can be achieved. If properly ex-
ecuted, the schedule is determined on the
basis of an equal share of water per unit of
land to be irrigated.
However, the study revealed that,
contrary to the common belief, the rigidity
of the official pucca warabandi had almost
ceased to exist. None of the watercourses in
the study sample followed the official
warabandi schedules in actual practice. The
practical meaning of the official warabandi
appears to lie in the fact that it fixes the
right to irrigation water for the participating
water users, a right they can continue to
exercise if they have to, or can relax in
actual practice, but use in any litigation,
or in any appeal for further arbitration or
adjudication, when their access to water is
jeopardized in any way. Farmers refer to
this function of warabandi as haqooq. The
form of rights defined by an official
warabandi assumes a formal “legal right.”
The official warabandi is accepted by the
majority of small farmers as more
equitable than the traditional kachcha
warabandi schedules, as the latter were
often determined by a few powerful rural
elites.
Given that an adequate legal and
institutional framework can ensure the
recognition and compliance of official
warabandi schedules when needed, and
mitigate the informal pressures from the
local elites who try to supersede them, the
warabandi method would serve to provide
inalienable water rights to the poorer
farmers.
Official Warabandi and Agreed
Warabandi
For the purpose of this report, two terms
are used to represent two different versions
of warabandi schedules, official warabandi
and its second-generation agreed warabandi.
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They refer, respectively, to the warabandi
schedule officially determined and recorded
in official documents, and the schedule of
water turns derived after this official
warabandi has been adjusted through mu-
tual agreement by the water users for prac-
tical purposes. The agreed warabandi
schedules are sometimes not available in
recorded form. For this study, the field
teams developed them through extensive
farmer interviews in the field.
Field investigations showed that the of-
ficially sanctioned warabandi schedules
were often not adhered to in practice, and
were superseded by substantially modified
schedules. The reported reasons for these
modifications were:
• changes in water supply
• changes in the physical layout of the
watercourse
• changes in landownership and tenurial
status
• other power relationships among the
water users
Unless a strong dispute arises in the
process of modifying the official warabandi,
a general consensus among the water users
in the watercourse would lead to this
agreed rotation schedule.
Most of the official warabandi sched-
ules are not updated for a number of years
even though the number of water users
9Agreed warabandi is a
derivative of the official
warabandi and is mutu-
ally agreed upon by the
people for their conve-
nience. For instance, a
big landowner may di-
vide his water turn into
several component
turns with the consent
of other farmers. This
new schedule is not re-
flected in the official
schedule.16
have increased substantially since the last
official amendment. This delay itself could
lead to unofficial modifications of the
schedules by the water users themselves. As
long as they are not disputed by an indi-
vidual water user, or a group of water us-
ers, the procedure does not allow any offi-
cial intervention. The two inter-related rea-
sons explain the present high prevalence of
agreed warabandi.
Data collected from official records and
through farmer interviews were analyzed to
compare the official and agreed warabandi
schedules for one watercourse (at RD 89250
of the left bank of the Pir Mahal Distribu-
tary). Table 6 gives the variation in the two
sets of time allocation values for different
turns in official and agreed warabandi
schedules for this watercourse.
Table 6 shows that the modifications
made on the official warabandi have gener-
ally resulted in an increase in the irrigation
time per unit of land (defined as “time allo-
cation”
10 in this report). The average value
for this measure derived from the official
warabandi schedule having 36 water turns
is 0.69 hours per hectare. In the agreed
warabandi schedule, in which the number
of turns had increased to 156, the time allo-
cation had increased to 0.82 hours per hect-
are. This is mainly because some farm plots
were not receiving any water at all. The in-
creases in coefficients of variation also sug-
gest that changes from the official to agreed
warabandi schedule have resulted in in-
creased inequity.
The case study of the Watercourse No.
89250-L of Pir Mahal suggested that, despite
the consensus reached among the water us-
ers, the agreed warabandi may not corre-
spond to a high degree of equity. To assess
this proposition, agreed warabandi data for
the 22 sample watercourses were analyzed
to calculate the variability of the time allo-
cations given to individual farm plots of
each watercourse. The results of this analy-
sis are given in table 7, which includes the
minimum, maximum, and average water
allocation values derived from agreed
warabandi water turns for various farm
plots within each watercourse, as well as
the average water allocation assessed on the
basis of the design CCA of each water-
course (i.e., duration of rotation period di-
vided by CCA). Figure 4 represents the co-
efficients of variation.
These results show a high variability in
the water allocated according to the mutu-
ally agreed schedules. Common agreement
among the water users implies that they are
TABLE 6.
Variability of water allocation, on hours per hectare basis, through
warabandi turns in Watercourse No. 89-L Pir Mahal.
Description Official warabandi Agreed warabandi
(n=36) (n=156)
Range 0.42 – 0.93 0.47 – 3.29
Average 0.69 0.83
Standard Deviation 0.09 0.25
Coefficient of Variation (%) 13 31
FIGURE 4.
Equity in water allocation through agreed warabandi sample water-
courses (kharif 1993).
10The “time allocation”
is defined, in this report,
as the irrigation time
per unit of land on the
basis of a constant dis-
charge to the water-
course. The time alloca-
tion in the warabandi
system is usually under-
stood in hours per acre.
It varies from one water-
course to another, de-
pending on the com-
mand area to be irri-
gated. For equitable dis-
tribution, the time allo-
cation measure should
not vary too widely
among the different
farm plots in a given
watercourse.17
generally content with variations in the wa-
ter allocation, or are unaware of the extent
of inequity that exists. The differences be-
tween the two average values relate to the
discrepancy between design intentions and
the present situation.
Table 7 also shows that, except in the
case of the Azim Distributary, the variability
is generally lower in the head reach water-
courses in each canal. In the Mananwala
Distributary, the watercourse at RD 24873-R
has low variability in the agreed water allo-
cation among the water users indicated by
a coefficient of variation of 0.24, which has
substantially increased towards the tail
reaches of the distributary—0.61, 0.44, and
0.43 in watercourses at RDs 87670-R,
121735-R, and 141542-R, respectively. Simi-
larly, in the Karkan Minor, the coefficient of
variation of water allocation has increased
from 0.19 in the head reach to 0.28 in the
tail reach watercourse. In the Pir Mahal Dis-
TABLE 7.
Variability of water allocation in 22 sample watercourses.
Watercourse Assessed Minimum Maximum Average Coefficient of
average allocation allocation allocation allocation aariation
(hrs/ha) (hrs/ha) (hrs/ha) (hrs/ha)
LOWER CHENAB CANAL IRRIGATION SYSTEM
Upper Gugera command area
MW 24873-R 0.98 0.62 1.85 0.91 0.24
MW 43506-R 0.75 0.27 2.47 0.82 0.38
MW 71683-R 0.87 0.42 2.72 1.01 0.39
MW 87670-R 0.70 0.44 3.58 0.86 0.61
MW 121735-R 0.66 0.27 4.13 1.06 0.44
MW 141542-R 0.33 0.37 2.92 0.72 0.43
KN 10435-R 1.06 0.64 1.90 1.04 0.19
KN 54892-R 1.09 0.30 2.82 1.14 0.28
Lower Gugera command area
PM 70076-R 0.90 0.67 3.04 1.04 0.28
PM 89250-L 0.96 0.47 3.29 0.83 0.31
PM 133970-L 0.75 0.20 3.29 0.86 0.45
JW 6619-R 1.42 0.74 1.85 1.19 0.14
JW 27290-R 1.20 0.84 3.29 1.33 0.44
JW 41234-L 1.09 0.32 8.23 1.51 0.87
FORDWAH BRANCH CANAL IRRIGATION SYSTEM
AZ 20610-L 1.41 1.01 4.94 2.00 0.53
AZ 43260-L 2.54 1.70 3.46 2.59 0.16
AZ 63620-L 1.39 0.35 4.37 1.70 0.59
AZ 111770-L 1.41 0.40 2.59 1.46 0.26
FW 14320-R 0.86 0.59 1.80 0.86 0.22
FW 46725-R 0.98 0.59 1.73 1.04 0.22
FW 62085-R 1.26 1.06 3.11 1.38 0.21
FW 130100-R 0.65 0.54 2.13 0.96 0.30
Notes: MW = Mananwala Distributary; KN = Karkan Minor of Mananwala Distributary; PM = Pir Mahal Distributary;
JW = Junejwala Minor of Pir Mahal Distributary; AZ = Azim Distributary; FW = Fordwah Distributary.18
tributary, the increase is from 0.28 to 0.45,
and in its minor Junejwala, from 0.14 to
0.87, whereas, in the Fordwah Distributary,
the coefficient of variation has increased
from 0.22 in the head reach watercourse to
0.30 in the tail reach watercourse. The Azim
Distributary appears to be an exception to
this behavior, probably because of the sea-
sonal abundance in the non-perennial canal
supply.
Agreed Warabandi and Actual
Warabandi Practices
Field observations of the actual application
of water turns by farmers showed that even
the agreed warabandi was not strictly fol-
lowed, and frequent changes took place on
timing and duration of turns almost on a
daily basis. While the reasons for introduc-
ing some flexibility in developing a more
functional warabandi on mutual agreement
can be easily understood, the divergence
between the official warabandi schedules
and what is actually practiced in the field is
unexpectedly large.
Table 8 shows the changes in duration
for the selected head, middle, and tail wa-
tercourses of the Upper Gugera and Lower
Gugera systems.
Table 8 indicates two important features
of the deviations from agreed warabandi
durations in the Lower Chenab Canal com-
mand area:
• Generally, there is no tendency for ei-
ther an increasing, or a decreasing
trend of these deviations from head to
tail of both Upper and Lower Gugera
Canal commands.
• In both areas, the incidence of small de-
viations is greater than that of the
longer deviations.
The majority of the irrigation turns that
have undergone some deviation in terms of
their duration are in the category of 0–0.50
TABLE 8.
Deviations (%) from agreed duration of water turns observed in 11 selected sample watercourses
of the LCC System during kharif 1993.
W/Cs Duration of deviations (hours)
Zero deviation 0–0.50 0.50–1.0 1.0–2.0 2.0–3.0 3.0 and above
MW 24-R 59 11 9 4 7 10
MW 71-R 80 9 4 5 1 1
MW 121-R 9 57 19 12 2 1
KN 10-R 15 18 24 22 6 15
KN 54-R 15 34 17 15 9 10
PM 70-R 45 29 8 11 1 6
PM 89-L 9 51 15 14 4 7
PM 133-L 10 34 27 21 4 4
JW 06-R 33 33 18 9 4 3
JW 27-R 41 19 8 13 4 15
JW 41-L 35 18 13 19 5 10
Notes: MW = Mananwala Distributary; KN = Karkan Minor of MW; PM = Pir Mahal Distributary; JW = Junejwala Minor
of PM.19
hour in terms of deviated time. These statis-
tics indicate that the farmers supplement
the irrigation of their fields by mutually
sharing time when the allocated time is
short of 15 to 30 minutes of the required
time for irrigation. This type of deviation is




In the beginning, when the warabandi
system was introduced in this area, the
rigidity of the fixed schedule was designed
to prevent the exploitation of water rights.
However, with increased cropping in-
tensities and changes in the cropping
pattern, the water allocation per unit of
land became inadequate. Generally, the
warabandi schedules have been found
unable to provide sufficient irrigation per
unit area for the average cropping intensity
(Bhatti and Kijne 1990). Due to the
increasing demand for water, some users
have started to develop strategies to
overcome supply inadequacy through
flexibility in water turns. Since overall
availability of surface water has not
changed, the flexibility is very often at the
expense of some part of the irrigable area
within the watercourse command for some
part of the rotation period. The main
strategies are outlined below.
• Rotation of turns. Two to three farmers,
and sometimes more, rotate their water
turns to improve equity, and concomi-
tantly the flexibility of using the sanc-
tioned supplies. This way, each week, a
farmer will share the effects of aberra-
tions in physical conditions that may
apply to a number of individual water
turns.
• Merger of turns. In this type of opera-
tion, water is used by two to three
farmers or more during a single water
turn. This often happens when the
farmers belong to the same family.
• Substitution of turns. This type of opera-
tion is prevalent in instances where a
farmer has a small landholding with a
short-duration water turn. This farmer
gives the water turn to the nearby large
landowner, and after two or three
turns, the large landowner gives suffi-
cient water to irrigate the entire plot of
the small landowner.
• Exchange of turns. Farmers have the
practice of increasing the flexibility of
water supply by exchanging canal
turns (lending and borrowing).
• Trading of turns. When farmers cannot
meet their water requirements for one
reason or another, they start buying ca-
nal water turns.
Water Transactions
To distinguish between informal exchanges
from financial transactions, the term
“trading” is used to specifically mean
purchasing and selling of water turns, or
parts thereof. Generally, farmers have a
tendency to increase the flexibility in their
access to water through exchange of their
assigned turns. Field observations in sample
areas indicated that almost all farmers
exchanged water turns at one time or
another. Table 9 shows that the propensity
to exchange turns is seen to be mostly
towards tail reaches of the distributaries or
minors. The borrowing of turns increases
from 14 percent in the head watercourse to
39 percent in the tail watercourse. Similarly,20
TABLE 9.
Trading and exchange of turns by the farmers in the LCC during kharif 1993.
Description Mananwala Distributary Karkan Minor
24-R 71-R 121-R 10-R 54-R
Total agreed turns 37 107 242 68 113
Turns in practice 37 109 230 60 94
Borrowed (%) 14 9 39 29 37
Lent (%) 20 9 50 34 48
Trading (%) 0 0 0 48 0
Description Pir Mahal Distributary Junejwala Minor
70-R 89-L 133-L 6-R 27-R 41-L
Total agreed turns 77 156 186 122 53 91
Turns in practice 82 167 181 104 54 88
Borrowed (%) 3 6 12 12 11 8
Lent (%) 5 2 33 15 12 11
Trading (%) 8 12 8 8 2 2
the lending of turns in the head water-
course was 20 percent while it was 50
percent in the tail watercourse in the Upper
Gugera area. Likewise, the exchange of
partial as well as full irrigation turns
significantly increases from 3 to 12 percent
(borrowing) and 5 to 33 percent (lending)
in the Lower Gugera sample areas. In the
Junejwala Minor, lending and borrowing
of water turns constitute a moderate
activity.
Purchasing or selling of canal water
turns is not provided for in the Canal and
Drainage Act, and is generally considered
nonlegal. Based on this common perception,
the water users tended to be reluctant in
divulging information on the sale and
purchase of canal water, but the persistent
field observations during the study found
that the operation of a water market was
not a common occurrence. Trading (pur-
chase and sale) of canal water took place
only in 5 percent of the total number of
turns in 17 selected sample watercourses.
Usually, trading of turns takes place during
the kharif season, because high water-
consuming crops (rice, sugarcane) are
grown during this season.
Intervening Causes of the Present Situation
In the foregoing, the reasons for the increas-
ing gap between the design and practice of
warabandi were traced to a combination of
factors related to warabandi’s physical and
institutional environments. The physical
system inherited some inequities which
made it difficult to maintain essential flow
conditions. The deterioration of the physical
system, which was caused by a neglect of
maintenance due to increased costs and re-
duced budgets, along with the related lack
of motivation among the agency staff, con-
tributed substantially to the flow variability
in the conveyance system. The noncompli-21
ance of operational rules by some water us-
ers and some agency staff became another
major cause for the deviations from the
agreed procedure. Apart from these, there
are a number of complementary causes for
the incompatibility between design inten-
tions and actual operations.
Role of Groundwater
Since the days of the original design, there
has been no substantial increase in water
availability in the canal systems. The up-
stream reservoirs mostly helped store water
and reduce the seasonal fluctuations; if they
contributed to any increase in farm-gate
availability, it was minimal compared to the
increased demand for water. However, with
the advent of private tube wells (now over
300,000 in number), the groundwater contri-
bution to the overall water supply was large
enough that it caused a significant change in
the environment of warabandi. Apart from
extracting additional supplies, the water us-
ers have increasingly resorted to use ground-
water mainly as a response to the daunting
fluctuation of the canal water supply.
The development of groundwater re-
sources in Pakistan, particularly in the
Punjab, could also be described as a main
benefit of the warabandi system. The pro-
portional distribution of water has enabled
some farmers to reach a level of adequacy
where at least part ownership of a tube well
is possible. This contrasts with the typical
demand-based system where a portion of
the commandable area is irrigated and has
no need of tube wells, and the other portion
has descended to a poverty level where the
financing of tube wells is not possible.
Tube well data collected in the sample
command areas were analyzed to quantify
the private tube well utilization. The peak
utilization of tube well water is during the
kharif season. For the Mananwala and Pir
Mahal distributary command areas, ground-
water use varied between 26 and 100 per-
cent of the total water supply. For the
Fordwah and Azim areas, the groundwater
utilization rates were in the range of 8 to
100 percent of the total water supply, and
TABLE 10.
Contribution of groundwater (%) to irrigation supplies.
Watercourse No. of Contribution of groundwater (%)
details tube in comparison with canal supplies
wells May June July August September October
Mananwala and Pir Mahal areas (LCC)
MW 71-R 53 58 63 80 76 70 75
MW 121-R 17 34 26 100 33 35 40
PM 70-R 12 40 56 63 68 65 50
PM 133-L 34 64 71 70 78 73 59
Azim and Fordwah areas
AZ 63-L 13 28 16 21 46 34 31
AZ 111-L 11 78 77 88 100 94 97
FW 62-R 14 8 9 13 37 14 10
FW 130-R 18 12 15 45 50 38 30
Notes: MW = Mananwala Distributary; PM = Pir Mahal Distributary; AZ = Azim Distributary; FW = Fordwah Distribu-
tary.22
overall, showed an increased use towards
the tail portions of the distributary com-
mand. Table 10 highlights the important
role that groundwater plays in the irrigated
agriculture in different canal commands in
the study area.
While groundwater helped improve the
farmers’ reliance on water supplies, it also
tended to create anomalies in the
warabandi schedules concerning canal wa-
ter. Deviations from the warabandi proce-
dure in terms of changed turn durations,
water trading, and exchanges of turns
mostly occurred in watercourse commands
with access to groundwater.
Changed Socioeconomic
Conditions
Historically, small-scale irrigation develop-
ment was associated with the interest, de-
mand, and involvement of groups of local
people or communities. This linkage was re-
duced when the large-scale canal irrigation
systems were built during the colonial pe-
riod. Two main factors contributed to the
weakening of this linkage between local
community interests and the system man-
agement efforts. First, at least initially in
these large systems, as the demand for wa-
ter was generally less than the supply, canal
water was not immediately considered an
essential ingredient for the existing systems
of rural production. Second, in formalizing
the original inundation canals into the new
irrigation systems, the mathematical calcula-
tions for more equitable water distribution
patterns superseded the old traditional wa-
ter rights (haq), which were often based on
local political power, thus offending the en-
trenched local elites (Gilmartin 1994). As the
society was basically feudalistic, the resent-
ment of the local elites was matched by an
enthusiasm among the new settlers who
preferred to accept the more formalistic
agency-controlled management practices.
After independence, it appears that this
process was again reversed. With no mean-
ingful land reform in place, the large land-
owners had retained considerable power.
With the Green Revolution measures and re-
lated technological diffusion in rural areas, a
new rich class had emerged. These elements
combined to form a group of “influentials”
with political and economic power, who
started to exert their pressure generally on
the law and order situation in the canal en-
vironment. Part of the deviations observed
in the official or agreed warabandi sched-
ules is attributable to these changed socio-
economic conditions. In the present stage of
warabandi operations, the rather rigid, but
more equitable, official warabandi schedules
have been replaced by a flexible pattern of
behavior among the water users despite the
increased inequity associated with it.
The stabilization of this pattern in the
actual practice of warabandi can be explained
in two ways. The first is that the lack of en-
thusiasm to bring out any dispute over
warabandi before the relevant authorities is
matched by a bureaucratic inertia in general,
which represents the ineffectiveness of
agency staff to address such equity-based is-
sues. Meanwhile, for reasons such as the sub-
division of land, tenancy arrangements, and
change of ownership, several informal
changes have been incorporated into the ap-
plication of these schedules. The informal
character of these modifications has a ten-
dency to encourage other changes that are
linked with the convenience and the social
interrelationships. The second reason is, thus,
the increasing influence of informal institu-
tions in the rural society, like caste, biraderi,
11
political affiliation, and elitism (Bandaragoda
and Firdousi 1992), which tends to favor the
more influential people who can also afford
to resolve minor disputes informally.
11The tradition of
biradari in many parts
of Pakistan remains a
strong social norm, of-
ten operating against
the formal rules of irri-
gation. The term
biradari refers to a be-
havioral pattern based
on a feeling of brother-
hood, and is generally
among members of an
endogamous group who
consider themselves re-
lated to each other. This
term is of Persian origin
and a derivative of the
word biradar which
means “brother.”23
In a supply-oriented irrigation system, the
water users invariably respond to the quan-
tity and quality of the supply, including its
reliability, adequacy, and timeliness. In such
a context, the primary cause of the flexibil-
ity in the application of fixed water alloca-
tions can be identified as the flow variabil-
ity in the conveyance system. The study re-
sults show that in canals where the water
flow was highly variable over time, the flex-
ibility in the use of allocation schedules was
also high. So were the deviations from the
norms and traditions underlying the alloca-
tion rules.
The water allocation rules (water rights)
are closely related to the design of the
physical infrastructure and the organiza-
tions established for operating the system.
A balance is required among these three
factors to make the irrigation system func-
tional (Perry 1995). When substantial devia-
tions occur in the actual application of allo-
cation rules, as is happening in the case of
warabandi in Pakistan, the required balance
ceases to exist and the system tends to be-
come dysfunctional. Increasing inequity is
an indication that the balance among infra-
structure, water rights, and the organiza-
tional responsibilities as envisaged by the
design is steadily declining. The resulting
inadequacy and unreliability of irrigation
water, particularly in the tail-end areas of
the system, threaten the sustainability of the
system.
Given that warabandi is basically an al-
location of time for irrigation in proportion
to the size of the land to be irrigated, the
effective application of warabandi presup-
poses a flow of water in the watercourse at
a constant rate. One of warabandi’s primary
objectives, which is to distribute the scarce
water resources equitably among the water
users, also implies that the water flow rate
is uniform among the different water-
courses. However, the present study shows
that both these criteria are at stake in prac-
ticed warabandi and its environment.
While the flexibility in water use in
itself may be a desirable feature for
productive irrigated agriculture, it has to be
achieved with appropriate changes in the
infrastructure and associated organizations.
Besides, a demand-oriented flexibility in
water use may need adequate supplies for
achieving system-wide productivity. The
general water-short conditions in this region
made the warabandi system an ideal water
allocation method in a physical system
appropriately structured to require
minimum management effort at the
distributary level. The study indicates a
substantial gap between the warabandi’s
original design and its current practice.
While there are some easily identifiable
physical factors causing these discrepancies,
there are some socioeconomic factors which
are not easily observable. It is in the latter
that most of the adverse implications of this
flexibility may lie, and therefore, in-depth
studies are necessary to evaluate the
implications of warabandi as it is practiced
today.
This report, though limited in scope,
leads towards the following suggestions:
• Even within a flexible framework, an
officially recognized water allocation
system should be retained to represent
the “rights” of the water users, so that
in case of major disputes it can be used
as a basis for arbitration or adjudica-
tion.
• A regular updating of officially
recognized allocation rules should be
made possible to make the rules more
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realistic in terms of changes in tenure,
ownership, and physical infrastruc-
ture.
• To improve the water allocation opera-
tions in all parts of the physical system,
the formulation of the rules, such as the
calculations of water turns in the case
of warabandi, should be made on a
more scientific basis, taking into ac-
count seepage losses, as well as convey-
ance losses.
• For actual water allocation practices to
be as close as possible to design
expectations, the necessary physical
conditions (infrastructure in good
order) should be maintained so that the
related organizational and institutional
conditions will also be appropriately
made compatible with them. This
means that operation and maintenance
should be substantially improved to
ensure that the necessary water flow
conditions are established in the
conveyance system.
• The flexibility of water use, whenever
necessary and wherever feasible, can be
maintained by allowing the exchange
and trading of water turns among wa-
ter users, on the basis of their water
rights linked to landownership.
• Further field studies on the application
of warabandi allocation methods
should be encouraged to cover a sub-
stantial area in both Pakistan and India.
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